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Federal Habeas Corpus and the State Court
Criminal Defendant
Frank W. Wilson*
After tracing the development of federal habeas corpus, Judge
Wilson discusses three recent United States Supreme Court decisions

which have given rise to a tremendous increase in federal habeas
corpus petitions by state prisoners. To keep controversy between state

and federal courts at a minimum, he suggests several remedies, including the adoption by the states of post-conviction procedures which

will enable a state prisoner to assert all of his federal rights in the state
courts.

Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners is one of the most controversial and emotion-ridden subjects in the entire field of criminal
law. Considering the period over which this controversy has continued, it is surely one of the oldest unresolved disputes between the
state and federal courts. The removal of an action from a state to
a federal court may sometimes cause ruffled feelings, but few judges
remain long offended at being relieved of trying a lawsuit. On the
other hand, when a federal judge reverses a state judge who has
been affirmed by the state appellate courts, forcing him to retry the
case or free the accused, the sensibilities of even the most ardent
supporter of our dual system of federal and state government are
tested. Yet this illustration merely touched the surface of the emotional factors involved and gives little or no hint of the real and vexing
legal problems encountered.
The controversy has waxed-but rarely waned-for almost a century.
As long ago as 1891 the state courts were heatedly protesting "the
prostitution of the writ of habeas corpus, under which the decisions of
the state courts are subjected to the superintendence of the federal
judges .... ." Even before the era of Brown v. Board of Education,2
Mapp v. Ohio,3 Gideon v. Wainwright,4 and Escobedo v. Illinois,5
federal habeas corpus for state court prisoners was greatly agitating
*Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern
Division.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

25 Air. L. RFv. 149, 153 (1891).
349 U.S. 294 (1954).
369 U.S. 643 (1962).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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the more emotional critics of federal authority, straining the relations
and taxing the skill, diplomacy, and acumen of both federal and
state judges who were seeking less emotion and more reason in
composing this problem in federalism.
Habeas corpus, the writ by which anyone restrained of his liberty
may petition a court to require that his custodian appear with him
in court and account for the legality of his restraint, is as ancient as
the common law itself. Its origin is shrouded in the mists of antiquity.'
While there is some dispute as to the precise occasion which gave
birth to the writ, and doubt as to when it initially became entrenched
in English law, it had obviously received full recognition in England
by the time of the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679.7 That
act was adopted by Parliament and approved by the Crown in the heat
of the struggle over the return of Catholicism to the throne. So intense
was this struggle and so doubtful was its outcome that each side
consented to its adoption, for fear that they might have occasion to
need its protection on the morrow. Churchill described the adoption
of the Act of 1679 in the following terms:
This shortlived legislature left behind it a monument. It passed the Habeas

Corpus Act which confirmed and strengthened the freedom of the individual
against arbitrary arrest by the .

.

. government.

No Englishman, however

great or however humble, could be imprisoned for more than a few days
without grounds being shown against him in open court according to the

settled law of the land.... The descent into despotism which has engulfed

so many leading nations in the present age has made the virtue of this enact-

ment, sprung from English political genius, apparent even to the most
8
thoughtless, the most ignorant, the most base.

Habeas corpus was well recognized in America by the time of the
founding of our nation. This is shown by the incorporation of the
writ by name and without definition into the Constitution. Article I,
section 9, clause 2, provides: "The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it."
The use of habeas corpus by federal courts was authorized by
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, but such jurisdiction as was
then granted did not extend to petitions from state prisoners. It was
not until 1867 that Congress, anticipating difficulty in enforcing
Reconstruction measures, authorized a federal court to order the
discharge of any person held by a state in violation of the supreme
law of the land.9 Though procedural changes were made in the
6.
7.
8.
9.

See Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus, A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1948).
Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c.2.
2 CHURIcmrmx, A HISTORY OF Tim ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES 365 (1956).
Act of Feb. 5, 1867, Ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
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recodification of the Judicial Code in 1948,10 the statutory language
as to the scope of the writ has not been altered since 1867. Interpretation of that statutory language, however, has materially changed.
For many years following the act of 1867, the construction placed
upon it by the federal courts was that the writ should issue to a
state prisoner only if the state court which committed the prisoner
lacked "jurisdiction" to do so." Even this limited superintendence of
state court proceedings by federal courts was sufficient to call forth
vehement protest from the states. 12 Beginning with the 1915 dissent
of Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Frankv. Mangum,'3 which by
1923 had in effect become a majority opinion of the Court in Moore v
Dempsey, 4 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction was extended to a trial
lacking in due process by reason of being held under the sway of
mob pressures, even though the trial was jurisdictionally correct. A
similar result was reached in 1935, in Mooney v. Holohan,5 where
the Supreme Court held that the knowing use of perjured testimony
to obtain a state court conviction was a violation of due process and
therefore a basis for supporting federal habeas corpus. Although the
Court continued to speak in terms of lack of jurisdiction upon the part
of the state court, federal habeas corpus relief was really being
extended to all trials lacking in due process under the fourteenth
amendment.
In 1942, the Supreme Court expressly abandoned this stretching of
the jurisdictional fiction when it stated in Waley v. Johnston:
[T]he use of the writ in federal courts to test the constitutional validity of
a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment

of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it.
It extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in

and where the writ
disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused,
16
is the only effective means of preserving his rights.

Since that time, habeas corpus relief for state prisoners in federal
courts has been continually broadened by the expanded application of
the concept of procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment. At present the procedural requirements which are binding upon
state courts are almost identical with the procedural requirements
binding upon the federal courts under the Bill of Rights. Every new
fourteenth amendment right judicially formulated for defendants in
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Habeas Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1964).
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
Supra note 1.
237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915) (dissent).
261 U.S. 86 (1923).
294 U.S. 103 (1935).

16. 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL, 19

criminal proceedings becomes an additional ground for federal habeas
corpus.
Although federal habeas corpus expanded rapidly under the concept
of due process, there had early developed an important limitation on
the power of the federal courts to entertain applications for habeas
corpus from state prisoners. Beginning in 1886, a line of cases in the
Supreme Court developed the doctrine that an application for habeas
corpus should not be entertained by a federal court until the prisoner
has exhausted his state court remedies.' 7 This exhaustion of remedies
included application to the United States Supreme Court to review
the state court proceedings by appeal or certiorari. 18
In 1948, the Federal Habeas Corpus Act was amended, largely in
response to steadily mounting criticism of the expansion of federal
habeas corpus supervision of state court trials. Judge John D. Parker,
the chairman of the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States and the sponsor of a number of the
amendments, believed that the 1948 revisions 19 would reduce, if not
eliminate the "abuses" of federal habeas corpus and overcome much
20
of the criticism.
The 1948 revisions provide that an application for the writ may be
made either by the prisoner or by anyone acting upon his behalf. 21 It
should be pointed out that venue lies in both the district and division
in which the prisoner is held in custody. 22 The return must be made
in three days, or for good cause shown, not exceeding twenty days;
and the hearing must then be held within five days unless good cause
exists for extending the time for hearing.23 The statute provides that
successive petitions need not be entertained where the legality of the
detention has been determined upon prior application and no new
ground is presented.24 It was this provision that Judge Parker thought
would accomplish something akin to res adjudicata in habeas corpus
proceedings. Among the procedural rules laid down is the rule that the
certificate of a trial judge setting forth the facts may be admitted in
lieu of his appearance as a witness.25 Also, provision is made for
admitting depositions, affidavits, and transcripts of records from the
state court proceeding.2 The federal court may, if necessary, stay
17. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
18. Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
19. Habeas Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1964).
20. See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1964).
22. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964).

24. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964).

25. 28 U.S.C. § 2245 (1964).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (1964).

1966 ]

HABEAS CORPUS

the state court proceedings or stay execution of the state court
sentence.27 The "exhaustion of remedies" rule was adopted by providing for federal jurisdiction only when "it appears that the applicant
28
has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the state."
The writ need not actually result in the discharge of the prisoner;
indeed, in most cases the grant of the writ is expressly made conditional in order that the state may retry the prisoner in a fashion meeting constitutional demands. 29 The petition, of course, will not lie
unless the applicant is presently in custody.3" Nor will it lie if he is
in custody under more than one sentence and the legality of one
sentence is not in issue.31
Judge Parker's understanding of the accomplishments of the 1948
revisions to the Habeas Corpus Act is as follows:
Four things of importance are done by the revised Judicial Code relating to
the law of habeas corpus: (1) repeated applications of the writ by persons
convicted of crime are taken care of by a provision establishing the principle
of res adjudicata in a modified form; (2) a simplified procedure is provided
for cases which are to be heard; (3) in the case of federal prisoners, provision is made for relief by motion before the sentencing judge and right to
habeas corpus in such cases is greatly limited; (4) in the case of state
prisoners, resort to lower federal courts is practically eliminated where
32
adequate remedy is provided by state law.

An entirely different interpretation of the habeas corpus statute
from that envisaged by Judge Parker was not long in coming. In
1953, the Supreme Court in the case of Brown v. Allenm squarely held
that the state remedies were exhausted so as to permit a federal habeas
corpus action when the constitutional issue had once been presented
to the state courts with a review sought or excused in the United States
Supreme Court. Resort to a post-conviction remedy in the state
courts was held not to be a prerequisite. The federal trial courts were
fully back in the business of supervising the constitutionality of state
court proceedings rather than being "practically eliminated" as Judge
Parker had so confidently expected.
The revisions of the statute in 1948 accomplished certain procedural
reforms, such as eliminating the unseemly spectacle of a state judge
having to testify before a federal court upon the conduct of the trial
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1964).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).

29. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
30. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960). The rule is otherwise with regard to a
prisoner who has been paroled, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
31. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
32. Parker, supra note 20, at 173-74.
33. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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in his court. These revisions, however, failed to meet the main thrust
of the criticism of the state court judges and attorney generalsnamely, that final judgments of the highest state courts were being
reviewed by inferior federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings by a
single judge.
In 1954 the attorney generals of forty-one states joined in the case
of United States ex rel. Elliot v. Hendricks, in an effort to have the
Habeas Corpus Act itself declared unconstitutional insofar as it applies
to state prisoners. They were, of course, signally unsuccessful. Further
proposals for amendment were made by the Judicial Conference of
the United States, 5 including a requirement that a three-judge court
hear habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners. These proposals
aroused as much criticism as they attempted to meet. They were twice
passed by the House but each time were rejected by the Senate. And
fortunately so, for as subsequent developments have demonstrated, the
number of three-judge courts which would have been required would
have overwhelmed the federal judiciary. 5
The stage is now set for the most dramatic definition, if not enlargement, of federal habeas corpus in the history of our federal system.
By a striking trilogy of cases in the spring of 1963, the Supreme Court
either rewrote or redefined, depending upon one's viewpoint, the
modern law of federal habeas corpus. This trilogy consists of the
cases of Townsend v. Sain,3 Fay v. Noia,38 and Sanders v. United
States.3 9
These three cases, when considered together with sections 2241-2255
of the judicial Code, may not unreasonably be said to constitute the
alpha and omega of the present day procedural law of federal habeas
corpus as it relates to state prisoners. Townsend v. Sain dealt basically
with the problem of when, in a habeas corpus proceeding, a rehearing
of factual and legal issues would be necessary in the federal court
upon issues tried and decided in the state court. Fay v. Noia greatly
restricted the rule of exhaustion of state court remedies as a restraint
upon the power of federal courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions
from state prisoners. Sanders v. United States dealt with the nonapplicability of res adjudicata to habeas corpus proceedings and
34. 213 F.2d 922 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954).
35. REPORT OF THE JuDIcILk CONFE NCE Comzm-rE ON HABEAS Conpus, 33
F.R.D. 363, 365 (1963).
36. At its meeting in September of 1965, the Judicial Conference of the United
States withdrew its approval of the three-judge proposal.
37. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
38. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
39. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).

HABEAS CORPUS

established rules with regard to when successive petitions filed by the
same prisoner must be heard.40
Suppose that a defendant on trial for murder in a state court moves
to suppress his confession upon the ground that it was unconstitutionally coerced by administration of drugs. Both an issue of fact
and an issue of constitutional law are raised by the motion. After a
hearing, the state court overrules the motion to suppress and allows
the confession to be introduced. The defendant is convicted and
upon appeal his conviction is affirmed by the state supreme court.
After exhausting both his appellate and his post-conviction remedies
in the state courts, a petition for habeas corpus is filed in the United
States district court raising the issue of admissibility of the confession.
These were the facts in the Townsend case. The district court dismissed the petition on the basis of the state court record, without
holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court held that this
was error and remanded the case to the district judge with instructions
to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the confession
was coerced by the administration of drugs and whether the state trial
judge had applied the correct standard of federal constitutional law
in admitting Townsend's confession in evidence. The Court held
that irrespective of the record made in the state court, "where an
applicant for a writ of habeas corpus alleges facts which, if proved,
would entitle him to relief, the federal court to which the application
is made has the power to receive evidence and try the facts anew, " 1

and in such situations "must hold an evidentiary hearing if the
habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing
in state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceedAfter holding that "a federal evidentiary hearing is required
ing."'42 Atrh
unless the state-court trier of facts has after a full hearing reliably
found the relevant facts," the majority opinion then undertook, in
the form of stating "guidelines," to outline and comment extensively
upon six situations in which a federal court must hold an evidentiary
hearing and cannot merely rely upon the record made in the state
court.

3

It is to this "cataloging in advance of a set of standards

40. The Sanders case, supra note 39, involved a petition by a federal prisoner brought
under what is referred to in federal practice as a Section 2255 petition (28 U.S.C. 2255)
which, while it leaves venue in the sentencing court irrespective of the place of confinement of the prisoner, is in all other respects exactly commensurate with habeas corpus.
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). The rules announced in the Sanders
case were expressly made applicable to habeas corpus proceedings.
41. 372 U.S. at 312.
42. Ibid.
43. "We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas
applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not
fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact finding procedure employed
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that are to inflexibly compel district judges to grant evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings" 44 that the dissent is primarily
directed, although the three dissenting justices also felt that the record
reflected that the state court had "clearly accorded the petitioner due
45
process in this case."
On the same day that the Townsend opinion was announced, the
Court also decided the case of Fay v. Noia.' 6 As mentioned earlier,
beginning in 1886 with Ex parte Royall,47 the Court had developed a
doctrine that an application for habeas corpus should not be entertained by a federal court until the prisoner had exhausted his state
remedies. This rule was written into the statute in 1948 in the
following terms:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted unless it
appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
48
courts of the state.

In 1942 a defendant by the name of Noia, along with two co-defendants, was convicted of murder in a New York state court. The conviction of each defendant was obtained by use of signed confessions.
Noia's co-defendants appealed; and although their convictions were
affirmed on appeal, eventually, after protracted litigation, they were
successful in a post-conviction procedure in setting aside their convictions on the ground that the confessions were coerced. Noia did not
appeal, stating as one of his reasons that he was fearful that, if successful, he might receive the death penalty if convicted on retrial. Following the success of his co-defendants in setting aside their convictions,
Noia, some fourteen years after his conviction, sought relief in the state
court; but it was there held that his failure to appeal had barred him
from later attacking the conviction. He then brought an action in
the federal court for habeas corpus. The state conceded that his
rights under the fourteenth amendment had been violated in the
manner in which the confession had been obtained, but relied upon
his failure to exhaust his state court remedies as barring his federal
court habeas corpus petition under the statute quoted above. In a
by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not
adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that
the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing."
Id. at 313.
44. Id. at 326.
45. Id. at 334.
46. Supra note 38.
47. Supra note 17.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).

HABEAS CORPUS
sweeping opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan held, inter alia, that federal
courts have power to grant habeas corpus relief despite the petitioner's
failure to have pursued his state court remedies, provided only that
no remedy is "presently available" in the state court. As stated by
the Court:
Noia's failure to appeal was not a failure to exhaust 'the remedies available
in the courts of the state' as required by Section 2254; that requirement

refers only to his failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the applicant

at the time he files his application for habeas corpus in the federal court.49

Earlier contradictory authority, including Darr v. Buford, was
expressly overruled by the Court. Two other highly significant holdings in the majority opinion were: (1) "the doctrine under which
state procedural defaults are held to constitute an adequate and
independent state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review
is not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts
under the federal habeas statute"5 0 and (2) while a federal judge
"after holding a hearing of appropriate scope" has discretion to deny
relief to a habeas applicant who deliberately by-passed state procedures, no waiver affecting federal rights will be found unless the
habeas applicant, "after consultation with competent counsel or
otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of
seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state court. . . ."51 In
excellent statements of conflicting views upon the history of habeas
corpus jurisdiction and the nature and scope of the habeas corpus writ,
the majority and minority opinions in the Noia case arrive at opposite
legal conclusions. The majority opinion concluded that "the nature of
the writ at common law, the language and purpose of the Act of
February 5, 1867, and the course of decisions in this court extending

over nearly a century are wholly irreconcilable ..

with any

"..",52

limit on the power of the federal court to grant the writ because
of state procedural default or independent state ground that would
bar relief under state law. However, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for
the minority, after stating that the majority "had turned its back on
history and struck a heavy blow at the foundation of our federal
system,"53 concluded that: "There can, I think, be no doubt that
today's holding-that federal habeas will lie despite the existence of
an adequate and independent nonfederal ground for the judgment
49. 372 U.S. at 399.
50. Ibid.

51. Id. at 439.
52. Id. at 426.
53. Id. at 449.
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pursuant to which the applicant is detained, is wholly unprecedented."5
Within a month after the Townsend and Noia opinions, the Court
handed down its opinion in Sanders v. United States,55 the third case
in the modem trilogy of federal habeas corpus. Sanders was a federal
prisoner who had been sentenced in 1959 to fifteen years imprisonment
upon his plea of guilty to a charge of bank robbery. The guilty plea
was entered after he had expressly waived counsel. The following
year Sanders filed a petition under section 2255, a federal prisoner's
equivalent to a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus, 56 asserting
that he was denied counsel and that he was intimidated and coerced
into entering his plea of guilty. The first petition was denied on the
basis of the record, without granting an evidentiary hearing. Within
nine months Sanders filed a second petition asserting the same
grounds but adding that he was mentally incompetent at the time of
his plea due to addiction to narcotics. The district court again denied
the petition without a hearing, both on the basis of the record and
on the basis of the former petition having been denied. The court
held that Sanders must have known of the matters relating to
narcotics at the time of his first petition and thus had no excuse for
his failure to assert them. A divided Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to the district court for a hearing on the second
petition. The majority opinion of the Court, again written by Mr.
Justice Brennan, after affirming that a denial of habeas corpus was not
res adjudicata at common law, held that controlling weight could be
given to the denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus
only if "(1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application
was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application,
(2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of
justice would not be served by reaching the merits upon the subsequent application." 57 Thus, as stated by the Court: "Conventional
notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is
at stake and infringement or constitutional rights is alleged." 8 The
Court concludes that any other interpretation of a statutory restriction
might raise serious constitutional questions.
Mr. Justice Harlan, again speaking for the minority, protests "the
implication in the Court's opinion that every decision of this Court
in the field of habeas corpus.., has become enshrined in the Constitution because of the guarantee in Article I against suspension of the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 463.
Supra note 39.
See note 40 supra.
373 U.S. at 15.
Id. at 8.
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writ" 59 and concludes that "both the individual criminal defendant
and society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point
be a certainty that comes with an end to litigation and that attention
will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from
error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful
place in the community." 60
The effect of Townsend, Noia, and Sanders upon federal habeas
corpus litigation, as could well be imagined, has been nothing less
than dramatic. In the seventeen-year period between 1941 and 1957,
a total of 8,596 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the federal courts,
ranging from a low of 134 in 1941 to a high of 814 in 1957. In the
fiscal year of 1964, 3,531 habeas corpus petitions were filed by state
court prisoners; and in the fiscal year 1965, 4,664 such petitions were
filed. Thus, in the two years since Townsend, Noia, and Sanders,
almost as many petitions have been filed as were filed in the entire
seventeen-year period between 1941 and 1957. In 1965 prisoner
petitions of all types comprised twelve per cent of the civil case load
in the federal district courts. 61
Many criticisms have of course been made of the recent decisions
regarding federal habeas corpus. Not all of them are deserving of
repetition, for some of them are more the product of emotion than of
reason. Suffice it to say that many reasoned criticisms have been made,
and it is not without reason that the Conference of Chief Justices of
the fifty states calls annually for modification of the law granting
habeas corpus jurisdiction to the federal courts over state prisoners.
Certainly the dissenting opinions in Townsend v. Sain, Fay v. Noia,
and Sanders v. United States are reasoned criticisms and are deserving
of the most respectful consideration. They may even yet have their
effect, for as stated by Mr. Justice Douglas upon an occasion when
he found his views not to be shared by a majority of the Court,
2
"[H]appily, all constitutional questions are always open."
It would appear, however, that those who look for any fundamental
or significant alteration in the federal law of habeas corpus, either
through congressional action or from the Supreme Court, may look
in vain. With respect to federal legislation, while some procedural
improvements may be accomplished, it would appear that the Supreme
Court may have read into the Constitution most of its recent holdings
in regard to the exhaustion of state remedies, successive petitions for
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id. at 24-25.
61. ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTATVE
STATES Couras, at 1-3 (1965).
62. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1962).
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habeas corpus, inapplicability of res adjudicata, and lack of conclusiveness of state court findings. Moreover, recent real or apparent
miscarriages of justice in the politically sensitive civil rights field may
well have resulted in a national political atmosphere favorable to
enlarging federal jurisdiction rather than restricting it. Wholly apart
from principles of stare decisis, it would seem to be an even more
remote possibility that the Supreme Court might modify its views.
As reflected in the recent case of Henry v. Mississippi,63 the Court
is fully aware of the criticism its recent decisions in the field of habeas
corpus have engendered, but it expects the solution to lie with the
states. From the following language of the Court, it is apparent not
only that the Court is aware of the criticism, but also that it confidently
expects Mohammed to come to the mountain-and not the reverseand desires to afford Mohammed every opportunity to do so:
The Court is not blind to the fact that the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
has been a source of irritation between the federal and state judiciaries. It
has been suggested that this friction might be ameliorated if the states would
look upon our decisions in Fay v. Noia and Townsend v. Sain, as affording
an opportunity to provide state procedures, direct or collateral, for a full
airing of federal claims. That prospect is better served by a remand than
by relegating petitioner to his federal habeas remedy. Therefore, the judgSupreme Court
ment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Mississippi
64
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

An even more recent and dramatic example of the Court's attitude
in this regard is shown in Case v. Nebraska, 5 where the Court, after
granting certiorari, remanded a state habeas corpus proceeding to
afford resort to a newly enacted state post-conviction procedure. Two
justices, in concurring, openly expressed approval of the enactment
of such legislation broadening the state post-conviction procedure to
encompass review of all federal rights of state court prisoners, and
they commended such legislation to all states.
It is apparent that the responsibility for resolving the problems
which are now arising in increasing volume in the field of federal
habeas corpus as it relates to state prisoners is a joint responsibility
of the state and federal courts. They are both charged with the
responsibility of seeking in good faith to administer the law of federal
habeas corpus as it has now been enunciated by the highest court in
the land. With mutual respect and tolerance and with a proper
regard for comity, the emotional problems, if not the judicial volume
of such litigation, can be reduced.
63. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
64. 1d at 453.
65. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
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Other steps can be taken to reduce not only the burden, but possibly the volume of such litigation. If lawyers, judges and law enforcement officers would together rededicate themselves to strictly and
scrupulously observing all constitutional rights accorded an accused
at every stage of the proceedings, within both the letter and the spirit
of the law, the occasion for granting habeas corpus would so dwindle
as to significantly affect the volume of filing of such petitions in both
the state and federal courts. Each violation of a constitutional right
which must be corrected by habeas corpus breeds a multitude of less
legitimate habeas progeny.
Another practice which would materially reduce the burden of
habeas corpus petitions now flooding the state and federal courts
would be the making of explicit and careful findings of fact and
conclusions of law on issues involving constitutional rights. The Townsend case itself might never have arisen had the trial judge made
some findings of fact and a statement of the law upon which he
overruled the motion to suppress the confession rather than merely
pronouncing, "motion overruled." No less important is the matter of
the making and preserving records of evidentiary matters in both
criminal and post-conviction proceedings. Resourceful trial judges
are devising many other methods for making habeas corpus petitions
more informative and more intelligible, and for reducing the likelihood
of repeated petitions from the same inmate.6 6 That trial judges retain
considerable discretion and are afforded considerable opportunity for
originality in this regard was recognized by Mr. Justice Brennan in the
Sanders case.
Finally, we remark that the imaginative handling of the prisoner's first
motion would in general do much to anticipate and avoid the problem of a
hearing on a second or successive motion. The judge is not required to
limit his decision on the first motion to the grounds narrowly alleged, or to
deny the motion out of hand because the allegations are vague, conclusional,
or inartistically expressed. He is free to adopt any appropriate means for
inquiry into the legality of the prisoner's detention in order to ascertain all
possible grounds upon which the prisoner might claim to be entitled to
relief.67

Finally, among the most promising proposals for reducing federal
habeas corpus supervision of state criminal proceedings is the enactment of state legislation providing post-conviction remedies coextensive with the federal remedies. Much of the current difficulty is due
66. Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestions for Section 2255 Cases, 32 F.R.D. 393, 398
(1963). See also the court rules and accompanying terms and instructions concerning
habeas corpus petitions which have been adopted by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois in 33 F.R.D. 391 (1963).
67. 373 U.S. at 22.
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to the fact that the rights which a prisoner can assert in a federal
court and the type of habeas corpus hearing available to him there
more often than not cannot be asserted or are unavailable to him in
state courts.68 For state courts to be permitted to retain maximum
control over the administration of criminal justice, it will be necessary
for the states to provide post-conviction remedies which enable a state
prisoner to assert all of his federal rights in state proceedings that
conform to the requirements of Noia, Townsend, and Sanders. It was
the enactment of such legislation by the state of Nebraska which
occasioned the recent remand by the Supreme Court of a prisoner
to his state court remedy in Case v. Nebraska.69 To assist states in
meeting this problem the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws have
drafted a Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.70 Six states have
71
A number
now enacted the Uniform Act or legislation similar to it.

of other states are in the process of evaluating their post-conviction
procedures and of proposing legislation in the light of recent developments in the law of habeas corpus.72
Even so, many of the problems which arise in federal habeas corpus
and the controversies they engender will doubtless be with us for
the foreseeable future. We must, accordingly, continue to be careful
that the problems and controversy do not cause us to "lose sight of
the forest for the trees." Habeas corpus is still the greatest instrument
for the safeguarding of individual freedom under law yet devised by
man. As long as men love freedom, so long will they honor the writ
of habeas corpus. As stated by Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes,
"It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the
precious safeguard of personal liberty
and there is no higher duty
73
than to maintain it unimpaired."

68. See A.B.A., Section on Judicial Administration, Effective State Post-Conviction
Procedures-TheirNature and Essentialities,4-5 (Aug. 1958 Draft); 9B ULA 345-47.
69. Supra note 65.
70. UswoFmns POST-CONVIcTON PROCEDURE Aar, 9B ULA 352.
71. See ILL. Rlv. STAT. Ch. 38 §§ 122-1 to -7 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14 § 5502 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 27 §§ 645-A to 645-J (Supp. 1964); NIn.
LEG.Bum 836, 75th Session; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222; OnE. REv. STAT. §§
138.510-.680 (1963).
72. The Law Revision Commission for the State of Tennessee has recently drafted a
proposed Post-Conviction Procedure Act for Tennessee based upon a revision of the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act as recommended by the Harvard Student
Legislative Research Bureau.
73. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1938).
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